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LAW, DIPLOMACY, AND FORCE:
NORTH KOREA AND THE BoMi3

BY KENNETH

W DAM*

When I chose this topic I did not anticipate that
the negotiations for a U.S.-North Korea agreement
would be concluded so soon. When I first heard that
the negotiations had in fact led to an agreement, I
considered changing the topic. However, that phase
passed in a few minutes. I recalled the words of a
Navy admiral, Jonathan Howe, with whom I had
the pleasure to serve in the State Department. This
wise officer reminded his colleagues many a morning
that first reports are almost always wrong or at least
misleading. It has been my misfortune to learn that
his dictum, which he applied to disasters and to military encounters, also applies to diplomatic events.
So my effort here will be to put the U.S.-North
Korean agreement in context and to ask what it
might really mean, especially for the future and for
what has sometimes optimistically been called the
New World Order.
Two preliminary comments: First, the North
Korean crisis is the most serious national security and
foreign policy issue that the Clinton Administration
is confronting. This crisis is not behind us but rather
is a long-term crisis that may not be resolved for
many years. It dwarfs Somalia, Haiti, and even
Bosnia in significance. The reason is clear.
Nuclear nonproliferation outweighs other concerns for the simple reason that North Korean
nuclear weapons, delivered by North Korean missiles
that they are developing, threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of Asians. Indeed, if North Korea
were to develop a nuclear weapons capability, we
have every reason to believe that they would sell it
to several rogue nations in Asia and Africa and
thereby threaten the lives of hundreds of millions

* Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, University of
Chicago Law School and former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, 1982-85.
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more in Europe. In decades to come, as they develop an intercontinental missile delivery capability,
the threat may extend North America as well.
Moreover, the North Korean issue, if not properly
handled, can easily lead to a nuclear Japan, an outcome that would revolutionize the foreign policy
dilemmas facing the United States. But more of the
stakes later.
My second preliminary comment is that I chose
this topic not to bring you up-to-date on an interesting aspect of current events. Rather, I chose it for
this law school audience because it provides an
important example of the role of law, and especially
its limitations, in world affairs. And it also shows
that where the coercive power of law is not available, then two other instruments of influence play a
crucial role. I speak of diplomacy and force. By force
I refer to a range of options from economic sanctions to the actual use of military weapons with all
that that implies for armies and civilians. I particularly want to highlight why force must be tightly
coupled with diplomacy rather than being viewed as
a residual capability for possible use only after diplomacy fails, and why any threats of military force
must be credible.
Few people have ever gone to law school who have
not pondered the meaning of international law. Some
never get much past the existential issue whether or
not international law exists. Without entering into
that well-known yet still largely impenetrable thicket,
we may observe that nuclear non-proliferation policy
is based on a treaty that sets out a relatively clear set
of substantive prohibitions and duties and that both
the United States and North Korea have acceded to
this treaty and thereby committed themselves to
abide fully by those rules. The rules are set out in the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which
entered into force in 1970.

Law: The NPT
Under the terms of Article I the United States,
one of five declared nuclear weapon states (along
with Britain, France, China, and Russia, as successor
to the Soviet Union), has pledged not to assist other
countries in manufacturing or otherwise acquiring
nuclear weapons. In turn, under Article II, more
2

than 150 other countries-including North Korea,
which signed the NPT just two years ago in 1992have committed themselves not to acquire nuclear
weapons. Quite aside from whatever legal force the
commitments might have, they certainly have
played a crucial role in nonproliferation diplomacy
because they have insured that nuclear aspirants will
deny those aspirations as well as any steps toward a
nuclear weapons capability. A crucial additional
point is that the Treaty provides the essential
authority and framework for the inspection activities
of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which have played such a large and public
role in recent events not just in North Korea but in
Iraq as well.
The North Korea crisis threatened to call into
question the continued existence of this vital treaty
for several reasons. One result of the U.S.-North
Korean agreement therefore may be to assure the
NPT's continued vitality, at least for a time. Let us
look briefly at the prospects for the NPT. In the
original NPT negotiations several countries, notably
Germany and Japan, opposed a treaty of indefinite
duration. As a result, the NPT calls for the parties to
meet twenty-five years after its entry into force to
determine, by an absolute majority of all the parties,
"whether the Treaty' shall be extended indefinitely,
or for an additional fixed period or periods."
Consequently, next spring, twenty-five years after
the NPT's entry into force in 1970, the world will be
treated to the spectacle of a review conference in
New York to determine the future of the world's
nuclear nonproliferation regime. While it can be
argued that the language I just quoted gives only the
alternatives of indefinite or fixed period extension
and does not allow a vote to terminate the Treaty
and while the votes now appear to be in place for an
indefinite extension, the review conference could
still turn into a shambles that would render the NPT
just another piece of yellowing international paper
representing past ideals and aspirations.
Quite aside from the complications presented by
the North Korean imbroglio, the NPT has generated
much resentment, indeed political resistance. It is
not popular with many non-nuclear countries, especially in the Third World, who find the discrimination inherent in the different treatment of the five
Article I declared nuclear weapons states and all
3

other states-the so-called Article II states-intolerably discriminatory. And some of the latter argue
strenuously that the five Article I countries have
failed to live up to some specific NPT obligations.
The first is the obligation of all parties under Article
IV to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy in
all member states through "the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and
technological information." Some countries, especially in the Third World, challenge the advanced
countries' nuclear export controls on this ground.
(To me, the objections to the principle, although
not necessarily the scope of these controls, should
more properly be directed at the failure of the world
community to address adequately the efforts of some
Article II countries to evade their NPT commit-

ments through clandestine nuclear weapons development programs.)
A second obligation imposed squarely on the
Article I countries that provides a good basis for criticism is the alleged failure of the Article I nuclear
weapons states to discharge their Article V duty to
"pursue negotiations on effective measures relating
to the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament." Several events have muted
somewhat the force of this argument. The conclusion of START I and II agreements by the superpowers is, at the least, a large down payment on this
obligation, although the rejectionist attitudes of
China, France and even Britain, have to be
acknowledged. Another development is the decision
of the Clinton administration to reverse the ReaganBush refusal to proceed with the negotiation of a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, although the
negotiations thus far do not seem to be making
much headway for various reasons.
Complicating the picture for next spring, influential voices in some Article I countries have not just
called into question the bona fides of some countries' Article II commitments. They have even cynically suggested that the best strategy for acquiring a
clandestine nuclear weapons capacity is to first join
the NPT and then deal with the IAEA in such a
way that the Agency gives well-publicized favorable
reports on the facilities that the IAEA is entitled to
inspect-namely, those facilities that the countries
in question declare as nuclear. Certainly the failure
of the IAEA safeguards to be able to detect Iraq's
4

clandestine program, which was much more
advanced than most observers imagined possible and
in direct violation of Iraq's freely-given NPT commitments, have created a basis for this suspicion.
Another complicating aspect concerns the
Article I countries themselves. One example is the
apparent willingness of China to continue to assist
Pakistan in its nuclear program even after China
signed the NPT in 1992. Still another complicating
aspect, leading to great cynicism about the effective
of nonproliferation efforts, stems from the growth in
the number of so-called de facto nuclear powers, of
which the most often mentioned are India, Pakistan,
and Israel, none of which have signed the NPT.
Despite these general problems with the structure
of NPT member state obligations and performance,
the tactics-some would say the antics-of the
North Korean government have created serious
doubts as to the credibility of the NPT, especially as
North Korea's maneuvers have come so close to next
spring's review conference. Quite aside from North
Korea's failure to declare certain facilities that were
revealed by publicly disclosed U.S. intelligence to be
almost certainly nuclear waste sites and the outright
refusal to permit IAEA inspections of them on the
very ground that they had not been declared by
North Korea to be nuclear facilities, North Korea
took further steps that cast doubt on the credibility
of the NPT as applied to states like it. When backed
into an international public relations corner by
other countries over the inspection issue, North
Korea declared its intention on March 12, 1993, to
withdraw from the NPT effective three months later
on June 12. Yet after an IAEA finding of North
Korean non-compliance with North Korea's safeguards agreement with the Agency and a Security
Council resolution in support of the Agency's position, North Korea announced on June 11, 1993just one day short of its self-declared final withdrawal date-that it would "suspend" its withdrawal.
Now, mind you, the NPT has no provision for a
country to withdraw-for good and obvious reasons.
And no one knows what a suspended withdrawal
means, though the North has treated it as a unique
status in which they can control the timing and
scope of inspections even of declared facilities.
For example, as even the most casual TV news
viewer will recall, the North went even further late
5

this past spring by beginning to withdraw fuel rods
from its five megawatt reactor without permitting
IAEA inspectors to inspect the rods. This was a
transparent device for avoiding accountability for
production and use of plutonium resulting from a
1989 incident with respect to spent fuel from the
same reactor. In fact, the refusal to permit inspection
this year made it impossible to determine how much
plutonium may have been diverted in 1989 and
therefore made it extremely difficult to determine
how much reprocessed weapons-grade plutonium
North Korea already has. In February of 1993, nearly
two years ago, CIA Director Woolsey testified publicly "to the real possibility that North Korea has
already manufactured enough fissile material for at
least one nuclear weapon, and is hiding this from the
IAEA."' The amount of plutonium in this year's
unloading would be enough, if it were diverted, for
four to five nuclear bombs, according to Secretary of
Defense William Perry.2 Beyond its bearing on that
capability, this year's fuel rods unloading constituted
a resounding slap in the collective face of the world
community which was shown to be unable to
enforce the NPT in the face of provocative duplicity
and intransigence.
What the North Korean actions highlight is the
lack of credibility in the present international legal
structure. Is the NPT just a useful self-deception? Is
the NPT at most a convenient mechanism for cooperation among willing countries on nuclear nonproliferation, especially for justifying IAEA inspections,
without providing any real muscle behind those
inspections and especially behind critical IAEA
findings? Although it is unlikely that the NPT
regime will collapse at next spring's review conference, and perhaps the U.S.-North Korea agreement
will be a talking point in favor of indefinite extension, it also seems unlikely that the NPT will be significantly strengthened. In short, the likelihood is
that the NPT will continue to be on balance a useful, yet ultimately ineffective instrument in combating nuclear proliferation.
Let us now turn to what instruments are left if we
1 Quoted in testimony of Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis,
Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea 9 (Senate Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 3, 1994).
2 David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea
Have?," 50 Bull. of Atomic Scientists 46, 48 (No. 5) (Sept. 1994).

6

discount the role of law in stopping proliferationnamely, diplomacy, and force. Before doing so, however, this is a useful time to review the known facts
about the North Korean nuclear program. I do so
not just to make clear the subject of recent diplomacy but also to underscore what is at stake for the
entire world.

Facts on the Ground
First, and this is particularly important for public
understanding, North Korea does have a nuclear
program. I mean this in two senses. First, it has a
large program to build nuclear reactors, ostensibly
for electrical power and indeed one can readily
accept this motivation as being at least in part sincere. But it is a particularly large program for a
country with a small population and the reactors
are of a type that produce comparatively large
amounts of plutonium, the vital raw material for
nuclear weapons.
Second, one is hard put to look at this nuclear
program in its entirety, especially if we accept what
U.S. officials say overhead photography shows and
what even unclassified French commercial satellite
photography shows, without concluding that North
Korea has been pushing forward toward nuclear
weapons. Indeed, its long-standing missile development program, in which a third generation missile is
being tested that could reach Osaka, Japan, merely
underscores the ominous nature of this nuclear
weapons program. The only real issue that has divided informed analysts is whether North Korea's
intention is to build nuclear weapons for their own
sake or to try to trade their nuclear weapons program
for economic assistance and diplomatic support from
the rest of the world. I shall return to this question
in just a moment.
But first let me point out that North Korea has
been building three nuclear power reactors, not just
the small five megawatt reactor at Yongbyon that
you have seen so often on television and in the
newspapers in connection with this year's fuel rod
contretemps. This reactor, by the way, is not even
connected to a power grid and thus, although called
experimental, seems to be of value to the North primarily as a source of plutonium. The other two reac7

tors are much larger. One is a 50 megawatt reactor
nearby that was expected to be completed in 1995
and the other is a 200 megawatt reactor at Taechon
whose completion was expected in 1996. This third
reactor could itself produce 250 kilograms yearly of
plutonium, which would be enough for at least ten
nuclear weapons each year. Indeed, some say that
eight kilos of plutonium is enough for a bomb. Still
further out is a large facility in the early stages of
construction at Simp'o.'
Even more worrying than the enormous plutonium potential of these reactors is a plutonium reprocessing plant, the kind of plant necessary to take
plutonium from spent fuel and upgrade it to
weapons grade. This reprocessing plant is located
adjacent to the small Yongbyon reactor involved in
the fuel rods episode. With regard to the reprocessing plant, the IAEA has declared that its inspections reveal evidence that North Korea reprocessed
more plutonium than it has declared to the IAEA.
It is this "Case of the Missing Plutonium" that has
played a central role in past diplomacy. And adding
a further ominous note is the continued refusal of
North Korea to permit inspection of the two suspected nuclear waste sites-I referred to earlier.
These sites are probably the locus of waste from the
reprocessing plant, which would reveal how much
plutonium the North had in fact reprocessed and
therefore how much weapons grade plutonium they
might have. These waste sites were detected by
U.S. satellite photography rather than being
declared to the IAEA by North Korea.' Indeed, it
was the IAEA insistence on inspection of these two
facilities that led directly to North Korea's declaration, subsequently "suspended," that it would withdraw from the NPT.

Bruce Blair, "IAEA: Mission Impossible?" Brookings Review 46
(Summer 1994). See estimate of five kilos of separated weapons-grade
plutonium per bomb, based on the assumption that plutonium lost in
the weapons manufacturing process is recovered. David Albright,
supra note 3. How many kilos of plutonium in spent fuel form would
be required depends to separate one kilo of weapons-grade plutonium
is unclear.
The information on these reactors is based on Arms Control
Association Fact Sheet, North Korea's Nuclear Facilities (July 21,
1994).
5 On the waste sites and the IAEA conclusions on the missing
plutonium, see David Albright, supra note 3.
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Diplomacy
Against the background of these kinds of "facts on
the ground," the United States launched a major
diplomatic initiative near the end of the Bush
Administration. This initiative had two prongs. The
first was to engage North Korea, long a pariah state,
in direct high level bilateral talks rather than to continue its diplomatic isolation. Undersecretary of
State Kanter kicked off the talks with a North
Korean delegation in New York in January 1992. The
second prong was to reassure the North Koreans that
they had nothing to fear from the United States.
Here, on the principle that actions speak louder than
words, the substance was the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.
The incoming Clinton Administration accelerated
the diplomatic pace. A new round of high level talks
were completed in July 1993 and, after a tense yearlong standoff that culminated in former President
Jimmy Carter's visit to North Korea this past June, a
third round of high level talks began in July and led to
the agreement reached this past month.
This U.S.-North Korean agreement has two
parts, a published "agreed framework" and a secret
annex. This secrecy need not be considered suspicious, by the way, because there are many good
reasons for secrecy with regard to details, and I am
comforted by the Administration's declafation
that the secret portion is "consistent" with the
published portion. What we do know is that the
United States has promised to supply North Korea
with a light water reactor capacity of 2000
megawatts (which has been described by
Ambassador Gallucci as made up of two separate
reactors). The United States has further promised
to provide North Korea with 500,000 tons of
heavy oil annually for heating and electricity generation free of charge until such time as the light
water reactors come on line. The light water reactors have the virtue, by the way, that they produce
much less plutonium per unit of electrical output
than the graphite-moderated reactors of the type
that North Korea is now using and building. As a
quid pro quo for the light water reactors and the
oil, North Korea has agreed to "freeze" its nuclear
program and eventually to dismantle its graphitemoderated reactors. The North has also agreed to
9

be, in effect, a good boy about the IAEA.
The bill for all of this is substantial. The light
water reactors themselves will cost about $4 billion.
The United States has prevailed on South Korea and
Japan to fund most of this cost. However, President
Clinton has had to assure the North personally by
letter that he will use the full powers of his office,
subject to Congressional approval, to have the
United States make good on any shortfall.6 Is $4 billion-plus too much, as Senator Dole implied when he
commented that the accord just shows that anyone
can get an agreement if he concedes enough?
Certainly diplomacy envisages the possibility of
paying for performance, and precedents can be found
aplenty in every Administration. After all, diplomacy
can, in principle, take only one of three forms. The
first is "sweet reason," in which we say to those we
hope to influence that they should do what we ask
because it is good for them or for the world. Anyone
who believes that sweet reason will move the North
Koreans will believe anything.
The second form of diplomacy is coercive diplomacy. It presupposes that we have leverage. We say,
if you don't do what we ask, we will do something to
you that you won't like at all.
The coercion that Americans have always
seemed to favor is economic sanctions, although I
must say that the sentiment in favor of economic
sanctions cannot be justified on the basis of their
efficacy. They have seldom worked, and therefore
the favor economic sanctions find in Washington
must be based on the theory that the best way to
deal with a problem is to kick it down the road to a
point in time when the problem will be someone
else's responsibility. Aside from whether economic
sanctions could in principle work with North Korea,
the fact is that the United States has already been
refusing to trade with North Korea for a long time.
Therefore, any effective threat of sanctions would
have depended upon the Chinese cutting off oil shipments and the Japanese cutting off massive transfers
of hard currency from Koreans living in Japan. These
Japanese transfers are estimated at up to $1 billion a
year, a considerable sum in hard currency for a coun6 Steven Greenhouse, "Clinton, in Letter, Assures North Koreans
on Nuclear Reactors," New York Times, Section A. p. 8 (Oct. 27,
1994).
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try whose GNP is estimated at $20 billion per year.'
A second kind of non-military coercion that can
be threatened is isolation. This sanction is what socalled recognition and non-recognition are about.
Among other hallowed methods of isolation are the
withdrawal of ambassadors and other subtle chess
moves of traditional diplomacy. Assuming the sanction of isolation has any value, and for some uncertain leaders of the United States it has sometimes
seemed the best of a bad set of options, isolation was
not available because the United States had already
successfully isolated North Korea. We had no diplomatic presence there at all, and all U.S. trade with
North Korea was proscribed. Moreover, a policy of
isolating North Korea was especially strange
because it played directly into the North's own
paranoid policy of "chuche," which can be translated, I am told, as "self-isolation." In any case, U.S.
isolation of North Korea may have been counterproductive because that policy has consciously
deprived us of an opportunity for insight into the
"black box" of North Korean decision-making.
Indeed, one can speculate that the October 1994
agreement, by providing for a relaxation of isolation
and the eventual establishment of full diplomatic
relations and an embassy in Pyongyang, may prove
the most important single measure in the eventual
transition of North Korea into a normal country,
perhaps in unification with South Korea.
The third kind of coercion that could be threatened was military force. In other words, full-scope
diplomacy would involve the threat of military force
itself. Here it is useful to distinguish between military force and the threat of it. They are closely
related. Military force without a prior threat that
could have obviated the action itself is usually irresponsible. A threat without the capability and willingness to carry it out is feckless and even dangerous. A threat that is not credible constitutes perhaps the greatest diplomatic mistake of all.

Force
Let us put diplomacy by threat to one side and
7 1991 figures given in testimony by Undersecretary Davis, supra
note 2 at 12.
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start this part of our analysis with the actual use of
military force. We must acknowledge that military
force can sometimes deal with proliferation; we must
never forget that the Israelis threw the Iraqi nuclear
program back perhaps a decade through a daring air
attack on a large nuclear facility in 1981.
Could such a bold strike have worked against
North Korea? I ask this question because if the United
States could not in fact take out the facilities in question, then there was little point in making the threat.
Aside from the little-recognized point that the popular
notion of a surgical strike rarely works in practice (the
Israeli/Iraqi example aside), there is some question
whether military raids, by aircraft or missile, could do
enough against the North Koreans, who after all are
world champions in tunnels and underground installations. So while we might have been able to take out
what we knew about, we could not take out what we
did not know about or what we might have suspected
but not known the location of. The one or more
nuclear bombs that CIA Director Woolsey spoke of
almost certainly fall in that category.
But even if a bold strike could work, the question
for diplomacy is whether the threat of such a strike
would be credible. After all, if the North Koreans do
not believe that the U.S. government is going to carry
out a threat, then that threat has limited utility at
best. But without getting into the question of the
abstract willingness to carry out such a strike, a factor
that ranks equally with the capability to do so, one
can surmise that the North Koreans effectively
deterred any U.S. attack through their imposing conventional capacity.
The sobering fact is that North Korea can apply
overwhelming force at the beginning of any hostilities
on the Korean peninsula. Though its population is
only twenty-three million compared with South
Korea's forty-five million, North Korea has an active
army of one million soldiers compared to Korea's
520,000. Moreover, North Korea has a surprising superiority in tanks and artillery, at least in numbers; for
example, it has 3700 main battle tanks compared to
the South's 1500. To be sure, the United States maintains about 26,000 Army as well as about 10,000 Air
Force personnel in South Korea.' But two factors ren8 Estimates of military strength are based on Int'l Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994-1995 178-81 (1994).
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der this U.S. offsetting capability less impressive than
might appear. The first is that in order to stop a North
Korean attack, U.S. air and ground forces would have
to be reinforced and that would take time.
The second factor is closely related. South Korea's
capital, Seoul, the world's fourth largest city with
over sixteen million people, lies only about twentyfive miles from the DMZ boundary. 9 There is no
assurance that Seoul could be held in the face of a
sudden North Korean attack. Moreover, the
approaches to Seoul and to some extent the city itself
are in range of North Korean artillery and surface-tosurface missiles comfortably ensconced in caves,
where they remain until the moment of firing. Hence
we would lack the capability to suppress this capability, at least completely and in time to be decisive. One
can only imagine the chaos that would be produced
by millions of South Korean civilians fleeing southward out of Seoul in the first few days of any war.
Worse yet, any attempt by the United States to
bring into Korea the force necessary to hold Seoul
might provoke the very North Korean attack it was
designed to deter because it would take time. The
North Koreans might well feel provoked to attack
while they still had time, even though we sitting
comfortably here might feel confident that the
South Koreans, with our help, would in the end win
any such war. Indeed, the fact that we do not know
enough about North Korea and its government to
know whether to take its counter-threats seriously
may itself have deterred the Administration and
South Korea when the North stated that they would
regard even comprehensive economic sanctions as
an act of war.
Any consideration by the Administration of the
use of military force would have had to take into
consideration the opposition to such a policy by
South Korea, Japan, and China, all of which wanted
the United States to fix the problem without provoking the North Koreans and without undertaking
even comprehensive economic sanctions. The
resulting U.S. hesitancy to use force must have been
increased after President Carter's trip to North
Korea last summer, especially after he said publicly
9 Population estimate based on U.S. Bureau of Census definitions,
World Almanac 1994, p. 829. Even under the South Korean definition,
Seoul has over ten million people.
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that he had told the North Koreans that he was
ashamed of his own country's call for economic
sanctions. What actually happened in the diplomacy
of the last six months, we do not, of course, know.
We do not know whether the Administration
backed up its diplomacy with threats of military
force. And we do not know whether such threats, if
made, were credible to the North Koreans.
What we do know is that the Clinton Administration, like many key personalities in prior
Administrations and like many in the Congress and
the media, has been reluctant about the use of force.
For this conclusion I rely on no less an authority
than President Clinton himself. In a recent Time
magazine interview (published in the October 31
issue), which was devoted entirely to the President
giving his philosophy of foreign policy, he responded to a vaguely critical question about whether his
Administration "suffered from a problem with the
projection of forcefulness." After conceding that he
had "some things to learn" about "the difference
between what you do and how you're perceived," he
launched into an explanation of his attitude toward
force. First, he said that force was important:
"We're not the world's policeman, but we do
have certain responsibilities. We will be more
respected if it's clear that we're making every
attempt to blend force with diplomacy."
After this remarkably clear statement, he then began
to backtrack by suggesting that use of force abroad
was a cheap domestic political trick:
"You may actually lose some political mileage
if there is no actual force: if the bombs aren't
dropped, and people aren't shot, and no one dies.
I understand that."
And in a further verbal tour de force, he made clear
that he thought it better to be known for one's good
intentions:
"But I also believe that that is a form of strength
when you know the power is there. It seems to me
that restraint is, in itself, a policy instrument,
which reinforces our good intentions."o

1o"Blending Force with Diplomacy," Time 35-36
14

(Oct. 31, 1994).

Now we all know that President Clinton talks a lot
and there is enough in this interview to provide quotations to support almost any possible philosophy of
foreign affairs. But this particular interview certainly
will not convince other North Koreas that they
should fear America's will to use force to achieve its
objectives. This is especially unfortunate given the
demonstrated willingness of the Administration to
use force in Haiti and its recent rapid movement of
military force to the Kuwaiti border.
In any case, what the President said in the interview, while using the right words about blending
force with diplomacy, does not give full weight to the
wisdom of George Kennan, who is reputed to have
said that it is amazing how much better diplomacy
works when a little force is introduced into the picture. Moreover, though the Administration's Haitian
and Iraqi actions demonstrate that the
Administration has been changing its attitude
toward force, it did in fact adopt early on the notion
widely held not just in the United States but in most
of the developed world, and certainly in United
Nations fora, that force is something to be applied
only after diplomacy has failed. Yet, as George Shultz
has noted, a policy of force as a last resort too often
leads to a situation where "force is the only resort and
likely a more costly one than if used earlier.""
The tendency of the United States in the past
few years to act the Hamlet of Nations may well
have tempted the North Koreans to toy with the
world community. Recall in this connection that
most of the serious debate in this country on North
Korea had to do with whether the North Koreans
really wanted the bomb or were only using their
nuclear program as a bargaining chip for economic
assistance. While I have little doubt that the answer
to that question is that the North Koreans wanted
both, the fact that the debate raged publicly in
Washington and divided different parts of the U.S.
government may itself have undermined any credibility of a threat of force and hence have undermined U.S. diplomacy generally.
Recently the Administration appears to have
come to a belated recognition of the need to couple
diplomacy and force. The most dramatic single piece
1 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph 650 (1992). The quotation
is from a 1984 Shultz speech about terrorism.
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of evidence demonstrating the need to couple the
two, rather than to exhaust diplomacy first, was the
fact that the Haitian generals and the Haitian president agreed to the Carter/Nunn/Powell entreaties to
allow U.S. forces to come in peacefully only when
they learned that U.S. troops were already in the air
and that they were coming to shoot their way into
Haiti. As I have already suggested, the prompt
movement of massive force to the Kuwaiti border is
another example of the use of force. It is worth noting that North Korea reached agreement with the
United States only several weeks after these events.
A further factor in producing agreement may have
been the deliberate and low-key way in which the
Defense Department did in fact increase U.S.
strength in South Korea by bringing in Patriot missiles and other non-offensive weapons over the past
months. In short, recent events may have strengthened the U.S. diplomatic hand and have helped
bring about the agreement. On the other hand, the
Administration's prior aversion to force may have
encouraged the North to call the U.S. bluff by itself
threatening force in reaction to sanctions, thereby
routing U.S. attempts to organize comprehensive
sanctions and greatly weakening the U.S. hand.
To recap what I have been saying, the Administration apparently could not achieve its diplomatic
objectives by sweet reason or by threats, whether of
economic sanctions or military force. Nor did it
choose to use military force, perhaps for the military
reasons I have suggested. It was therefore forced to
use a third category of diplomacy, the diplomacy of
exchange. It had to pay something to get the commitments it sought. There is absolutely nothing
wrong with such diplomacy. We do it all the time,
whether we are talking about the exchange of trade
commitments in NAFTA or the Uruguay Round,
about making pledges to international financial institutions, or about forming and extending alliances.

The Agreement Evaluated
To return now to the U.S.-North Korean agreement itself, the key question concerns not what it
cost us but rather what we gained. The price can
only be evaluated against the gain achieved. If this
agreement leads to the end of North Korea's nuclear
16

weapons program, then the price was surely modest.
But will that be the end point as opposed to merely
our objective and our hope? Earlier I gave my own
view that North Korea wanted both nuclear
weapons and whatever it could gain economically by
using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip. In
analyzing the agreement prudence dictates that we
assume that they still want both. While the North
Koreans may have gotten all they can expect for the
moment in economic assistance, they have two reasons to want nuclear weapons. One is security, and
the other is respect.
Let us take security first. The peninsula may well
seem nearly as dangerous a place for the North as it
does for the South, especially given the fact that it is
the only territory lying between China, Russia, and
Japan. The North Koreans and especially their leaders can easily equate nuclear weapons with independence and security. As for respect, they can hardly
have missed the point that France and to a certain
extent Britain have maintained an influence in
world affairs not fully justified by their economic
strength or their conventional military power.
These observations lead to two questions. First,
will the North Koreans be able to generate a second
tranche of assistance by backsliding on their commitments, and indeed perhaps a third and fourth
tranche, especially because the light water reactor
project is likely to slip past the presently projected
eight year completion period? Second, will the
North Koreans nevertheless be able to develop a
nuclear weapons capability of some type despite the
agreement, even if somewhat smaller and somewhat
later than they would have been able to achieve on
the path they were on? I note, in this last respect,
that there is nothing in the published agreement
that restricts their ballistic missile development program. Nor can we be sure that we have located all
existing North Korean nuclear facilities. With the
capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction,
even a very small inventory of nuclear warheads
would be destabilizing.
I have no doubt that the Administration worked
as hard and as energetically as possible in the negotiations to foreclose such an outcome. Certainly, in
Robert Gallucci the United States had an outstanding negotiator. Nevertheless, the Administration
wanted an agreement and it "wanted it now." Even
17

without access to the secret annex, one is therefore
justified in making a few critical observations without disparaging what was actually accomplished.
On the positive side, the agreement breaks out of
the limitations imposed by focusing solely on the
IAEA's right to inspect and on demanding an
accounting for what North Korea did in the past
with plutonium from the 1989 unloading. The main
thrust of the agreement is rather on the main point
of what North Korea is going to do in the future
with respect to its nuclear power reactors. The
essence of the agreement is that North Korea will
not refuel its small reactor and will not use the associated reprocessing plant but that it will freeze its
two large "reactors and related facilities."
As for IAEA inspections, North Korea has agreed
to allow the IAEA to "monitor" the freeze, though
such a task is nowhere in the IAEA's charter, which
may itself produce a problem. On the more general
question of the inspections that the IAEA is empowered by its charter to carry out, North Korea has
agreed to allow implementation of its existing safeguards agreement, but only after completion of the
first stage of the light water reactor project, a fiveyear stage of pre-nuclear construction after letting of
contracts. In short, implementation of safeguards to
which North Korea is already committed is pushed
off at least five years and in practice probably further
into the future.
What about those undeclared waste sites? Here
the agreed framework appears to pin down the North
to inspection, albeit in coded language and after the
five-plus years. At the end of the first construction
stage the North agrees to "take all steps that may be
deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the
accuracy and completeness of the [North's] initial
report on all nuclear material in the [North]." That
means that the IAEA is supposed to be able to take
whatever steps it deems necessary to verify the
amount of reprocessed plutonium and that means
inspecting the waste sites. So far, so good. If, however, the North says that the waste sites need not be
inspected, will we refuse to complete the light water
reactors? I will raise later the possibility that some
other country may want to complete the light water
reactors. But in any event this contingency may well
not arise until the term of the President elected in
18

November 2000. Or suppose the waste sites are then
inspected and the inspection shows that at the beginning of the 1990's North Korea did indeed divert
enough plutonium for one or two bombs or indeed
more." Will we really then-ten years later-do
something about it? Indeed, what will go on in the
interim in those two sites and what will be left there
once the inspectors are allowed in? For all of these
reasons, while the waste sites are important politically now, the main thrust of the agreed framework
should be viewed as what it does for the future in
freezing the North's nuclear program.
The agreed framework also deals with the fuel
rods unloaded earlier this year. The intention is
mutually declared to store and then dispose of this
spent fuel "in a safe manner that does not involve
reprocessing in the [North]." Presumably this means
shipping the spent fuel to another country. This part
of the agreement goes beyond any possible North
Korean obligations under the NPT and its existing
safeguards agreement and so it involves a commitment to more than it was committed to before."
As for any commitment to renounce an ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, whether by covert
development or by purchase, North Korea promises
only to remain a party to the NPT. But of course
North Korea by acceding to this agreement promises not to renounce its existing Article II commitment, which of course it had no right to renounce
anyway. Here again the North has committed in
the agreed framework to no more than what it was
already committed to. In this regard, it is well to
remember what the media tend to gloss over. The
IAEA inspects nuclear power plants and related
facilities to guard against diversion. It has no policy, indeed no legal power and certainly no practical
capa.city, to verify a country's intention or acts
involving nuclear weapons. For example, the IAEA
has no power to act against the acquisition of
12 The estimate of one or two bombs is based on the
assumption
that no fuel rods were unloaded between 1989 and 1994. That
assumption could be wrong and hence the quantity of currently available lutonium could be greater.
I have read that there is agreement that shipments of the spent
fuel to a third party must begin when the key nuclear components of
the first light water reactor are delivered to North Korea and must be
completed before that first reactor begins operations. Perhaps that is
in the secret annex, but it is not in the published agreed framework.
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nuclear components or even nuclear weapons themselves. Anything to be done along those lines must
be done by the signatories themselves, which brings
us full circle to diplomacy and force.
To look at the import of the agreement from
another perspective, let us assume that the North
has decided that it wants to have a nuclear weapons
capacity but that it can wait. What about the two
big reactors that can generate the plutonium for a
dozen or more warheads per year? They are to be dismantled but the dismantlement does not have to be
completed until the completion of the two light
water reactors, which will be at minimum eight years
from now. The published framework has no dismantlement schedule. But of course when the light water
reactors near completion, the U.S. leverage is less.
Remember that these North Korean reactors were to
be finished about one and two years from now,
respectively. Even assuming that no further work
goes on at their site, is it not reasonable to believe
that North Korea could secretly prepare elsewhere
the capability to complete them even more rapidly
as soon as the light water reactors come into operation? But, of course, the answer is that the Americans won't complete the light water reactors except
in synchronization with the completion of the dismantlement. But let's examine that assumption
about future American behavior critically.
If your mind has been trained by game theory to
consider all possibilities, then you are well prepared
to consider the North Korean understanding of the
rules of negotiation. According to Larry Niksch, a
Korean specialist at the Congressional Research
Service, the North considers the "breaking of an
agreement to be as legitimate a negotiating tool as
signing one"1 4 and certainly their past attitude
toward the NPT illustrates this principle. So let us
recall that many countries have the capability to
build light water reactors. Who knows what country
might find an interest in helping the North complete an American project, especially if, as seems
virtually certain given the primitive infrastructure
in North Korea, the project falls behind schedule. I
leave it to others to conjure up permutations and
combinations of these possibilities, but in doing so
Quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Pay in Advance," Far Eastern Econ.
Review 14, 15 (Oct. 13, 1994).
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it is important to remember that diplomacy is the
"art of the possible" and an agreement like this is
never going to read like a bill of lading or a corporate indenture.
Even if the agreement works exactly as hoped by
the American side, it nevertheless creates problems
for non-proliferation policy generally. The most
obvious point is that the United States has found
itself forced to buy out North Korea's existing
nuclear program, providing it with oil that will
relieve economic pressure imposed by the North's
shortage of hard currency and by giving it two brand
new world-class nuclear power plants. The incentives for other developing countries, particularly
those whose backward economic policies impose

severe problems, are obvious. In that sense this
agreement may turn out to be just one more complication in worldwide nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Another complicating factor for general nonproliferation policy is that the United States has just
agreed to give North Korea what we have been
strenuously arguing that Germany should not sell
Iran-namely, light water reactors. These reactors,
after all, do produce plutonium, the raw material of
nuclear weapons, just not as much plutonium per
unit of electoral output as North Korean-style
graphite-moderated reactors. In fact, since the reactors' capacity is so much larger than the reactors
now under construction, it is a technical question
what the comparative plutonium potential may be.
At best then, the agreement will tend to force the
United States to retreat from a policy of non-supply
to one that focuses on safeguards concerning spent
fuel. But this too is an area not covered by the published framework, except insofar as the new reactors
will be subject to IAEA safeguards. According to
press reports, the Pentagon objected to the provisions, presumably in the secret annex, about controls on North Korea's use of the spent fuel from the
light water reactors."

The Alternative to Agreement
The conclusion that the agreement leaves much
1 Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton Ups Atom Stakes," New York Times 7
(Oct. 20, 1994).
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to be desired is inevitable. But that is not entirely, or
even mainly, the fault of Administration policy.
Without the full support of Japan and China for economic sanctions and with what appears to be an
equivocal position by South Korea (a country that
even today is spending less than five percent of its
GNP on its own defense), 16 the United States was
inevitably in the position of demandeur. What then
was the alternative to this agreement? One alternative was the near certainty that down the line a few
years the North would have had nuclear warheads
and the missiles to deliver them.
With the completion of the two large graphitemoderated reactors, the North would have been in
the position to make at least a dozen nuclear
weapons a year." The technology of actually making
a warhead is not obscure. Let us suppose that it put
six in its military inventory and sold six to relieve its
foreign currency constraint. This would be a double
threat to world peace. First, who do you suppose
would be the natural customers? Iran? Iraq? Syria?
Libya? A newly fundamentalist Algeria? Already
North Korea is marketing its newest generation ballistic missiles to Iran and Syria.' One can only shudder at the consequences of allowing the nuclear program to go forward.
And what about the six it would add to its military forces each year? In view of the traditional
Korean hostility to Japan, based on the long
Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945, Japan
would almost certainly feel called upon to go
nuclear itself. Strong as public opinion may be on
the nuclear question, sporadic comments from
Japanese politicians reveal that the nuclear question
lurks not far below the surface of security thinking
in governmental circles. Japan already has all the
plutonium needed as well as reprocessing facilities,
and no one can seriously doubt its technological
ability to build warheads, missiles, and attack aircraft.
What we would then have is three very powerful
nuclear nations-China, Russia, and Japan-facing
Int'l Institute for Strategic Studies, supra note 9.
U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry estimated that the
200 megawatt reactor alone could produce plutonium enough for ten
to twelve nuclear weapons a year. Thomas W. Lippman, "Perry Offers
Dire Picture of Failure to Block North Korean Nuclear Weapons,"
Washington Post A27 (May 4, 1994).
1
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" Ibid.
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each other at close range in the Northeast Asia. To
this brew would be added a nuclear North Korea
and, in that scenario, probably a nuclear South
Korea as well. Carrying this scenario one step further
a nuclear Japan might in turn lead to a unified
nuclear Korea-seventy million strong-at the
intersection of this triangular nuclear confrontation.
This thought is enough to make the bipolar Cold
War seem stability itself.

Conclusion
The North Korean example thus underscores
not just the shortcomings of law, diplomacy, and
force, especially when they are not tightly coupled,
but it also shows how very high the stakes are in
the successful use of all three in keeping the peace
on this planet.
I recognize that I have not been able to deal with
the full complexity of the nonproliferation problem.
Rather I have taken what one can call a case study.
Perhaps nuclear proliferation is inevitable, although
one must recognize that it has not proceeded as rapidly this past fifty years as most experts predicted. Even
if it is in the end inevitable, much is to be gainedincluding the lives of untold millions-by slowing it
down. Dealing successfully with this problem requires
dealing with the issues of security and respect that
will drive countries to acquire nuclear weapons, just
as it has already driven the so-called de facto nuclear
states. This vast, complicated subject warrants more
serious attention, especially at the highest levels of
government, than it has been given.
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